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DANTE A. CAPONERA*

Patterns of Cooperation in
International Water Law: Principles
and Institutions
INTRODUCTION
Neither the requirements for efficient water resources management nor
the technical standards corresponding to the most "reasonable" regime
of water resource management are difficult to identify and propose. The
real difficulty concerns the political willingness of states to achieve institutionalized cooperation regarding water resources of each international
basin. Current experiments in the joint management of international water
resources can provide useful insights to states willing to cooperate. Many
similarities exist among the agencies established all over the world for
the purpose of assuring an equitable share in and the best utilization of
those resources. Essential structural features of cooperation include: government participation, principal and subsidiary organs, voting procedure,
and functions and powers of the agency. Similarities may develop into
established patterns in the course of time, only to be adapted to local
conditions. Such patterns, however, only indicate a practice which is not
binding on states sharing the same resource: detailed mechanisms and
procedures always are the free choice of states. The question of whether
states are also free to refuse any sort of cooperative arrangements at all
is impossible to definitively answer in the abstract. Any legal obligation
regarding water resources which arises out of current international law
can only be based on either the general principles and recommendations
expressed by and within the United Nations or on the customary principles
created by the states concerned within each water basin or system.
IDENTIFICATION OF RESOURCES INVOLVED
Cooperative arrangements, including principles and institutions, are
necessary to prevent, mitigate, administer, and solve problems arising
from the use of natural resources having transboundary impacts. These
arrangements refer to air; atmospheric, surface, and underground water;
hydrocarbons; oceans; and bio-resources (flora and fauna). This article
is limited to cooperative arrangements relative to water resources.
*Formerly Chief, FAO Legislation Branch; Chairman, Executive Council AIDA (International
Association for Water Law); Rapporteur on International Administration of the Committee on International Water Resources Law of the International Law Association.
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In the past, international relations bearing on the use, development,
and protection of water resources were restricted mainly to navigation,
and the resources involved were frequently identified as "international
rivers and lakes"' for the purpose of international law. New water uses,
and shortages for old uses, however, made it necessary to expand the
scope of the law and new definitions were proposed. The subsequent
expression "waters of international concern" is too vague, unless water
resources are already indicated by reference to a given use, as in the
Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways annexed to the Barcelona
Convention of 1921.2 On the contrary, the "drainage basin" doctrine, as
formulated by the International Law Association (ILA) in the Helsinki
Rules of 1966, 3 provides a broader definition which includes all water
resources delimited by the geographic notion of "watershed." The drainage basin concept covers not only rivers, lakes, and channels, but also
groundwater, canals, small and even seasonal streams, estuaries and,
depending on the interests which law is expected to regulate, floods,
erosion, flora and fauna. Still more flexible and comprehensive is the
definition resulting from the expression "watercourse system" which has
been adopted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations
in its most recent reports aiming at the codification of the law of nonnavigational uses of international waters.' A watercourse system describes
the resources shared by a plurality of states, not as a physical or geographic
element, but as a system, indicating the connection between these and
other components of the resources.
The connecting factor may be natural homogeneity or beneficial use,
but it also can be interdependence between users-in our case, between
states-in the exploitation, administration, and protection of certain water
1. The expression "international rivers or lakes" was used in article 108 of the Final Act of the
Congress of Vienna of June 9, 1815, reprinted in I HERTSLETT, A COLLECTION OF TREATIES AND
CONVENTIONS BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND FOREIGN POWERS 3, which dealt mainly with the European rivers; in the Treaty of Paris, March 30, 1856, reprinted in I HERTSLETr, COMMERCIAL
TREATIES 10, which extended to the Danube the principle of freedom of navigation; and the Act of
Berlin, February 26, 1885, reprinted in I HERTSLETT, COMMERCIAL TREATIES 62, which applied
the same principle to the Congo and Niger rivers. The expression is a recurrent feature in water
treaties of the nineteenth century. For a discussion of the various expressions, see Caponera, The
Law of International Water Resources, 23 FAO Legislative Study 4-5 (1980).
2. Barcelona Convention and Statute on the Regime of Navigable Waterways of International
Concern, April 20, 1921, arts. I and 2, 7 L.N.T.S. 37.
3. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION REPORT OF THE 52d CONFERENCE 484 [hereinafter cited as
ILA REPORT].
4. Evensen, First Report on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses,

UN DOC. A/CN.4/367 (1983). This also gives an account of previous reports. The term "system"
as applied to international watercourses was not new in literature: see Florio, Sur L'Utilisation des
Eaux non Maritimes en Droit International in FESTSHRIFT BERBER, 151, n. 1953 (1973). See also
UNITED NATIONS, MANAGEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL WATER RESOURCES: LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL

ASPECTS 14 (1976).

July 19851

INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW

resources. Thus, if the entire hydrologic cycle becomes relevant, even
rain, clouds, frozen water, deep mineral layers of groundwater, coastal
sea water, and the oceans may be taken into account to regulate certain
uses. A still wider range of natural resources might be included if activities
impacting the environment are envisaged. Depending on the interests
which have to be regulated, it is the law that identifies the resources
within the scope of its rules and principles, according to long-established
practice and emerging social needs.
PRINCIPLES AND RULES GENERALLY APPLICABLE
The question of the most appropriate definition of water resources in
international relations arises out of several attempts to formulate general
rules of international law for the codification and the progressive development of the law of nations. For centuries, national interests in the use,
administration, and protection of transboundary water resources had been
accommodated by means of agreement with reference to specific, welldefined watercourses and uses. 5 In the last fifty years, however, water
consumption for multiple uses and the need for global responses to water
demands have dramatically increased and actual or potential conflicts
have arisen. 6 Interested states, moreover, have often been unwilling or
unable to stipulate adequate treaties on the subject. As a result, jurists
have turned to general principles, and started looking to state practice
and legal thought for suitable definitions and rules.
The work accomplished on the subject by such distinguished bodies
as the Institut de Droit International(IDI), the International Law Association (ILA) and the International Law Commission (ILC) of the United
Nations indicates that the intended objective has been only partially attained. 7 No general rule of international law has been ascertained de lure
condito; only a few principles serve as guidelines in the interpretation of
existing law and law making. These principles and guidelines are not
binding law and do not impose legal obligations upon states. The guidelines and principles are, nonetheless, indispensable in determining the
purpose of the rule to be created and the ratio of the rule of law that
applies to specific cases. The principles are dependent upon two main
propositions:
5. For historic precedents, see Caponera, supra note 1,at 3-31.
6. Major recent or current conflicts include those relating to the rivers Danube, Rhine, Indus,
Ganges, Jordan, Plata, Nile, and Helmand. See Nanda, Emerging Trends in the Use of International
Law and Institutionsfor the Management of InternationalWater Resources, in WATER NEEDS FOR
THE FUTURE 15-37 (V. Nanda ed. 1977).
7. See, e.g., with regard to the I.L.C., Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on
the Work of its 28th Session at 153-62, U.N. Sales No. E.77 (Part II) (1977).
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(1) Common water resources are to be shared equitably between the
states entitled to use them, with related corollaries of
(a) limited sovereignty,
(b) duty to cooperate in development, and
(c) protection of common resources.
(2) States are responsible for substantial transboundary injury originating in their respective territories.
Principleof Sharing Resources
The concepts of "drainage basin" and "watercourse system" identify
the community of interests between states in the abstract. The difference
between these two concepts has been emphasized in the draft report
submitted to the ILC in 1983:
For several reasons the "international drainage basin" concept met
with opposition both in the discussions of the International Law
Commission and in the Sixth Committee. The concern was expressed
that the "international drainage basin" might imply a certain doctrinal
approach for all watercourses regardless of their special characteristics and regardless of the wide variety of issues and special circumstances of each case. It was likewise feared that the "basin"
concept put too much emphasis on the land areas within the watershed, indicating that the physical land area of a basin might be
governed by the rules of international water resources law. Consequently, the second Special Rapporteur introduced the concepts of
"international watercourse system" and "system States." In this context he stated that the term "system" is believed preferable.to, and
is distinct from, the terms "basin" or "drainage basin," primarily
in that its focus is on the waters and their uses and interdependencies. 8
Article IV of the Helsinki Rules of the ILA states: "Each basin State
is entitled within its territory to a reasonable and equitable share in the
beneficial uses of the waters of an international drainage basin." The
related comment to Article IV explains that "[t]his Article recognizes that
each basin State has rights equal in kind and correlative with those of
each co-basin State." ' Similarly, the 1983 ILC Draft conceives a legal
obligation based on reasonableness and equity:
An international watercourse system and its waters shall be developed, used, and shared by system States in a reasonableand equitable
manner on the basis of good faith and good neighbourly relations
with a view to attaining optimum utilization thereof consistent with
adequate protection and control of the watercourse system and its
components.
8. INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION REPORT at 27 nn.71-2 (1983) [hereinafter cited as ILC REPORT].

9. ILA

REPORT, supra note 3, at 486.
10. ILC REPORT, supra note 8, at 33.
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The principles of reasonablenessand equity provide the basis for a legal
rule in both instances. It is important to acknowledge, however, that
reasonableness depends on the natural features of each watercourse and
that equity depends on circumstances. The Helsinki Rules list the relevant
factors to determine what is reasonable and equitable in a particular case. "
The ILC Draft is even more comprehensive and emphasizes that water
sharing is not restricted to quantity apportionment. The ILC Draft also
focuses on the use, conservation, and development of the resources. 12
Neither the ILA nor the ILC text provides adequate evidence of the
existence of mandatory rules of international law because the proper rule
11. According to the Helsinki Rules:
(1) What is reasonable and equitable share . . . is to be determined in the light of all
the relevant factors in each particular case.
2) Relevant factors which are to be considered include, but are not limited to:
(a) the geography of the basin, including in particular the extent of the drainage
area in the territory of each basin State;
(b) the hydrology of the basin, including in particular the contribution of water by
each basin State;
(c) the climate affecting the basin;
(d) the past utilization of the waters of the basin, including in particular existing
utilization;
(e) the economic and social needs of each basin State;
(f) the population dependent on the waters of the basin in each basin State;
(g) the comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the social and economic
needs of each basin State;
(h) the availability of other resources;
(i) the avoidance of unnecessary waste in the use of waters;
(j) the practicability of compensation as a means of adjusting conflicts among users;
(k) the degree to which the needs of a basin State may be satisfied, without causing
substantial injury to a co-basin State.
ILA REPORT, supra note 3, at 488.
12. ILC REPORT, supra note 8, at 35, Arts. 8/1:
Determination of reasonable and equitable use
1. In determining whether the use by a system State of a watercourse system or its
waters is exercised in a reasonable and equitable manner in accordance with article 7,
all relevant factors shall be taken into account whether they are of a general nature or
specific for the watercourse system concerned.
Among such factors are:
(a) the geographic, hydrographic, hydrological and climatic factors together with other
relevant circumstances pertaining to the watercourse system concerned;
(b) the special needs of the system State concerned for the use or uses in question in
comparison with the neeeds of other system States including the stage of economic
development of all system States concerned;
(c) the contribution by the system State concerned of waters to the system in comparison with that of other system States;
(d) development and conservation by the system States concerned of the watercourse
system and its waters;
(e) the other uses of a watercourse system and its waters by the State concerned in
comparison with the uses by other system States, including the efficiency of such uses;
(f) cooperation with other system States in projects or programmes to attain optimum
utilization, protection and control of the watercourse system and its waters;
(g) the pollution by the system State in question of the watercourse system in general
and as a consequence of the particular use, if any;
(h) other interference with or adverse effects, if any, of such use for the uses or
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is shaped, in each single instance, according to the will of the parties
concerned. States are, therefore, consistently invited to arrive at mutual
understanding through consultation, negotiation, and agreement, with
reference to specific water basins or systems. 3 If the involved states fail
to reach an understanding, they can only rely on established legal procedures for the settlement of international disputes. Consultation, negotiation, and mutual agreement among the involved states imply a perception
of the water unit as a natural phenomenon and envisage the corresponding
community of interests as a "social" community that ought to be regulated
according to reason and equity. This perception is quite different from
describing the community of interests as a "legal" community in which
resolution of transboundary water resource disputes are mandated by law.
Limited Sovereignty
Reasonableness and equity cannot, by themselves, be considered as
law, i.e., as independent sources of international rights and obligations.
These principles, however, do limit other principles on sovereignty. In
particular, they mark the rejection of the principle of absolute territorial
sovereignty whereby a state has the exclusive and unlimited right to utilize
and dispose of international waters flowing through its territory. The
principle of absolute territorial integrity, moreover, may no longer be
considered an established unconditional right. Consequently, downstream
states may no longer claim unaltered water volume and quality within
their territory. The principles of equity and reasonableness describe the
interdependence of states in a water community, whereas the principles
of state sovereignty illustrate exclusive jurisdiction within the state territory. Confronted with a factual situation, nothing prevents the independence of sovereignty from giving way to interdependence suggested by
the principles of equity and reasonableness. Principles of international
interests of other system States including but not restricted to-, the adverse effects upon
existing uses by such States of the watercourse system or its waters and the impact
upon protection and control measures of other system States;
(i) availability to the State concerned and to other system States of alternative water
resources; . . .
13. ILC REPORT, supra note 8, at 36, Art. 8/2:
In determining . . . whether a use is reasonable and equitable the system States concemed shall negotiate in a spirit of good faith and good neighborly relations in order
to solve the outstanding issues. If the system States concerned fail to reach agreement
by negotiations within a reasonable period of time they shall resort to the peaceful
settlement procedures provided for in Chapter V of this convention. (emphasis added).
Similarly, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) when apportioning the resources of the continental
shelf in the North Sea Continental Shelf case, resorted to equity as a guideline and called on the
interested States to create their own rules by common agreement: ". . those principles being that
delimitation must be the object of agreement between the States concerned and that such agreements

must be arrived at in accordance with equitable principles." 1969 I.C.I. 46 n.85.
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law must be consistent with the evolving practices of states; after all,
sovereignty itself is only one, albeit the most significant, of many circumstances to be taken into account in the interpretation and development
of international law.
Duty to Cooperate in Development
The logical implication of the concept of community of interests is
"cooperation," however controversial its meaning is in international law.
De lege lata, no duty for the basin or system state to cooperate, is likely
to be found outside the framework of an international agreement. The
enunciation of principles expressing some obligation about information,
consultation, and negotiation, de legeferenda, however, is in line with
current international practice.' 4 The latest trends of international law,
moreover, suggest states are expected to delay new works or utilization
of international shared water resources for a time that circumstances
indicate as "reasonable" pending negotiation.' 5
Another principle inferred from the water community concept is that
basin or system states promote cooperation for the purpose of long-term,
systematic planning of the use of shared water resources. 6 The obligation
for states to establish appropriate procedures for coordinated development
of municipal legislation on water law, with special reference to liability
and compensation, appears to be more stringent and, therefore, more
perplexing. 7 Finally, the question of whether legal principles, alone, are
sufficient to force states to establish appropriate mechanisms to jointly
manage shared water resources is unresolved. 8
Apart from any consideration of the binding force of these statements, 19
implementing international cooperation in water use, management, and
protection is not an easy task. In the most favourable conditions, cooperation is the result of lengthy negotiations and unabated good will.
Although widely accepted as a guide to concrete determinations, the
"equitable utilization" or "apportionment" principle has not always proved
adequate. National interests often prevail when shared resources have to
be allocated, when priorities have to be established among different uses,
and when decisions have to be enforced. Decisionmaking on these issues
14. On this topic, see Bourne, Procedure in the Development of International Drainage Basins:
The Duty to Consult and Negotiate, 10 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 212-34 (1972).
15. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Council Rec. C(74)222,
Title E, n.8 and the Annex, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS (ILM) 1975 at 246.
16. Id., Title B, n. 1.
17. See U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 22 (Stockholm Conference 1972),
reprinted in Caponera, supra note 1, at 154.
18. ILA REPORT OF THE 58TH CONFERENCE 249 (1978).

19. Florio, Water Pollution and Related Principles of International Law, 17 CAN. Y.B. INTL L.
134-58 (1979).
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seldom rests in a joint commission, committee, or like institution. More
often, all relevant decisions are negotiated piecemeal and approved unanimously by all states concerned, whether separately or within a collegiate
body. Institutionalized cooperation is more successful in preparing the
necessary data for decisionmakers: collecting and standardizing information, investigating facts, and considering special circumstances, are
prerequisites to a more equitable determination of shared water benefits.
Responsibility is sometimes given to a technical body or to a joint commission to: (a) prepare draft regulations to be enacted and enforced by
member states; or (b) to perform other administrative functions such as
registering and licensing.20 The idea of joint planning for a whole international water system also has gained ground along with the "basin"
approach.21
Duty to Cooperate in Protection
Principles are emerging from state practice concerning protection of
water resources and transfrontier water pollution, especially with regard
to toxic industrial waste and the spread of waterborne diseases. Individual
states, as a first measure, are expected to adopt adequate legislative and
administrative provisions to regulate and control frontier water pollution
within their jurisdiction, insofar as technically feasible and consistent
with the economic condition of the country concerned.22 States are also
expected to develop and improve techniques for the utilization, recycling,23
and purification of frontier waters within their respective jurisdictions.
Compatibility with available technology and with local socioeconomic
circumstances is, again, a limiting factor as the principles become more
exacting. For instance, the OECD upheld a provision that states promote
improved water quality through the establishment of priorities in the use
20. For instance, the Permanent Indus Commission between India and Pakistan; the India-Bangladesh Committee created to administer the sharing scheme of the Ganges waters at the Farakka
barrage; the Mekong Secretariat; the Executive Secretariat of the Lake Chad Basin Commission; or
the Secretariat of the Kagera Basin Organization.
21. Many basin organizations have been organized and assisted by the United Nations system,
such as the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Senegal Basin Development Organization, the Gambia
Basin Development Organization, the Mekong Committee, the Niger Basin Authority, and the Kagera
Basin Organization.
22. See Treaty Concerning the Regulation of Water Management Questions Relating to Frontier
Waters, December 7, 1967, Austria-Czechoslovakia, art. 3,4, 728 U.N.T.S. 356. See also Agreement
Concerning Frontier Watercourses, April 24, 1964, Finland-U.S.S.R., art. 4.1, 537 U.N.T.S. 254;
Agreement Relating to Water Quality in the Great Lakes, April 15, 1972, Canada-United States,
art. 4, 837 U.N.T.S. 220.
23. The following statement by OECD may be quoted as a good illustration: "Sewage treatment
and disposal policies should be strengthened by various means such as recycling and making beneficial
use of effluent and sewage sludge." OECD Council Rec. C(76)161, Annex A/15. Similarly, Principle
VII/2 of the European Water Charter, reprinted in Caponera, supra note 1, at 212.
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of water resources not in conflict with neighboring countries' priorities. 4
It has been stressed that individuals in a country affected by water pollution
originating within the jurisdiction of another country be ensured equal
protection in any resulting judicial procedures.25 In a broader context, the
necessity of preventing water pollution that may harm or threaten the
fundamental interests of the international community has received attention.26
Responsibilityfor Injury Across Frontiers
The perspective of international responsibility does not dispel doubts
about the binding force of the principles mentioned regarding the use,
development, and protection of shared water resources. Many attempts
have been made to employ the general principles of responsibility as a
substitute for specific, mandatory rules, but the attempts have failed for
the same reasons that prevent equity from substituting the rules of law.
Responsibility, like equity, refers to the application of the law which
depends on circumstances and, consequently, cannot be formulated in
terms of general rules.
States are, however, undeniably responsible under general international
law for acts and omissions concerning activities that take place within
their jurisdiction. States must account for any such activities which adversely affect the interests or the rights of other states. If the detrimental
effects were properly "defined," a general rule might be derived from
those definitions. But the harmful consequences of activities bearing on
water resources can only be assessed by reference to the beneficial uses
of water and to the water quality standards required by said uses. For
example, the Canada-U.S.A. Water Quality Agreement on the Great
Lakes defines the harmful quantity of a noxious substance as "any quantity
of a substance that if discharged into receiving waters would be inconsistent with the achievement of the water quality objectives." 27 The assessment and legal significance of the harmful pollution, therefore, depend
on the beneficial uses which may be affected. The importance of these
24. OECD Council Rec. C(74) 224, Title B/l/c; European Economic Community (EEC) Council
on Principle Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, Directive on the Quality Required of Surface Water
Intended for the Abstraction of Drinking Water in the Member States, June 16, 1975, 18 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 194) 38 (1975); Council Directive of March 20, 1978, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
84) 43 (1978).
25. E.g., EEC Directive, June 16, 1975, id.; Council Directive of March 20, 1978, id.
26. The draft article on international responsibility adopted by the ILC at its 35th Session (1983)
admits that an international crime may result from serious disregard of the fundamental interests of
the international community in the field of human environment (Art. 19/23(d)).
27. Agreement Relating to Water Quality in the Great Lakes, April 15, 1972, Canada-United
States, preamble, 837 U.N.T.S. 213.
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uses, however, is relative to each watercourse and dependent upon the
circumstances. The determination of whether the injuring state's conduct
was legitimate or illegitimate cannot, therefore, be provided by a general
and abstract rule.
More specific definitions regarding water resources have been incorporated into recent international treaties and agreements. Treaties regarding single watercourses have dropped the "substantial" or "appreciable"
attribute as a criterion when evaluating harm and liability. The treaties
contain more detailed provisions which define the beneficial uses or the
water quality standards ("black" and "grey" lists). 28 Regional and bilateral agreements establish the required water quality, the admissible
toxicity, the persistence and accumulation, as well as the kind and quality,
of pollutants .29 Each treaty containing water quality standards is stipulated
for definite waters and for particular uses and users. Any deviance or
extrapolation from these standards, therefore, is likely to cause confusion.
Water quality standards resulting from existing treaties, even though substantially similar in different texts, cannot be taken as acceptable generally. The standards are relevant only when considered with other factors
and in conjunction with the general standards of international responsibility for assessing injury, fault, and negligence.
In conclusion, the principles and rules of international water resources
law developed in this section are not yet firmly established. The principles,
however, are evolving rapidly under the pressure of the realization that
water resources are limited in quantity and quality. International law also
assists states in creating the appropriate procedures and machinery for
cooperation and joint management.
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR COOPERATION AND
MANAGEMENT
International water development and protection is best achieved, as
proven by state practice, by resorting to administrative procedures and
28. Among the most conspicuous examples: Agreement Relating to Water Quality in the Great
Lakes, April 15i 1972, Canada-United States, art. L/e and Annex 1, 837 U.N.T.S. 213; Convention
on the Protection of the Rhine Against Chemical Pollution, December 3, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 253 (1977)
(signed at Bonn between Germany, France, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Switzerland, EEC, Belgium,
Denmark, Ireland, Italy, and the United Kingdom); European Convention on Detergents, September
16, 1968, 788 U.N.T.S. 183. With regard to land based pollution, see the Barcelona Convention
for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution, February 16, 1967, 15 I.L.M. 290
(1976) (with related protocols and annexes).
29. The kind and quality of pollutants are listed in one or more annexes dealing with salinity,
crude oil, persistent plastic and other synthetic materials, organohalogen compounds, pesticides,
radioactive wastes and so on. See, e.g., The Agreement Between the United States of America and
Canada signed at Ottawa, November 22, 1978, United States-Canada, 30 U.S.T. 1383, T.I.A.S.
No. 9257; Agreement on the International Commission for the Protection of the Rhine Against
Pollution signed at Bern, April 29, 1963, 994 U.N.T.S. 3.
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agencies which are endowed with adequate powers and the necessary
flexibility to handle the constant changes brought about by increased water
demand, new uses, and technological advances. Various mechanisms
adopted by states to regulate the utilization of shared water resources are
discussed in this section of the article.
Global Institutions
Because of the importance of and the potential conflicts arising over
shared water resources, many of the institutions of the United Nations
are engaged in a wide range of activities involving water management
and facilitating intergovernmental cooperation.3" The United Nations Secretariat has prepared publications to assist states to cooperate in the development of shared water resources. The Secretariat, moreover, has acted
as a catalyst in designing, establishing, strengthening, and supporting
intergovernmental water resources institutions for the purpose of facilitating transboundary cooperation. A panel of experts convened in 1969
to study the legal and institutional aspects of international water resources
development. 3 The panel emphasized the need not only to establish
appropriate international rules pertinent to the management of international non-maritime water resources under the auspices of the United
Nations, but also to establish adequate administrative arrangements among
states sharing the same water basin.
The most important recommendations regarding institutional arrangements have come from the United Nations Water Conference held at Mar
del Plata, Argentina, in 1977.32 The approved Mar del Plata Action Plan
stated that:
States sharing water resources . . . should cooperate in the establishment of programs, machinery, and institutions necessary for the
coordinated development of such resources... and establish joint
committees ....
to provide for the . . . collection, standardization
and exchange of data, the management of shared water resources,
the prevention and control of water pollution, the prevention of waterassociated diseases, mitigation of drought, flood control, river improvement activities, and flood warning systems.33
30. Institutional support is provided, inter alia, to basin institutions of the Mono (Benin-Togo),
Logone (Cameroon-Chad), Senegal, Kagera (Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania), the Gambia (Gambia,
Senegal, Guinea), Paraguay (Argentina, Paraguay), Yaguaron (Brazil, Uruguay), Vardar/Axios (Greece,
Yugoslavia), and Mono (Liberia, Sierra Leone).
31. United Nations, Panel of Experts on the Legal and Institutional Aspect of International Aspects
of International Water Resources Development. Management of International Water Resources,
Natural Resources/Water Series No. I at 181-4, U.N. Sales No. E.75.11.A.2 (1975).
32. Report of the United Nations Water Conference, Mar del Plata, March 14-25, 1977, U. N.
Sales No. E.77.II.A.12) (1977).
33. Id.

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 25

Pursuant to Resolution VII of the Mar del Plata Action Plan, the U.N.
Secretariat convened a meeting of the International River Organizations
at Dakar in 1981"4 for the purpose of "developing a dialogue between
the different organizations on potential ways of promoting the exchange
of their experience." The meeting concluded that "multinational activities
in respect of international watercourses should be supported by appropriate machinery at the national level which would act as a liaison with
the international agencies and coordinate and take account of the various
sectors involved at all levels of administration concerned. . . ." The
agreement establishing international water organizations, moreover, "should
at least contain, within the framework of principles of international water
law acceptable to the contracting states, the following elements which
should be defined as clearly as possible: objectives, territorial jurisdiction,
composition, authority and power, decisionmaking procedures, financial
provisions, procedures for the prevention and settlement of disputes.""
The U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, held in Stockholm
in 1972,36 also proclaimed a number of principles bearing on water within
the broader context of protection of the human environment. Among them,
Principle 24 and the Action Plan declare that cooperation through multilateral or bilateral arrangements is essential in international relations to
protect and improve the environment.37 The Conference further recommended that ". . . [g]overnments concerned consider the creation of river
basin comissions or other appropriate machinery for cooperation between
interested States for water resources common to more than one jurisdiction . . ." Following the Stockholm Conference, the United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP) was created as a secretariat to implement international cooperation regarding environmental aspects of shared
water resources."
34. United Nations, Experiences in the Development and Management of International River and
Lake Basins, Proceedings of the U.N. Interregional Meeting of International River Organizations,
Dakar, Senegal, May 5-14, 1981, Natural Resources/Water Series No. 10, U.N. Sales No. F.82.1I.A. 17
(1983).
35. Id. at 9.
36. Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment held at Stockholm,
June 5-16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF./48/14/Rev. 1 (1972).
37. International matters concerning the protection and improvement of the environment
should be handled in a cooperative spirit by all countries, big or small, on an equal
footing. Cooperation through multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other appropriate
means is essential to effectively control, prevent, reduce, and eliminate adverse environmental effects resulting from activities conducted in all spheres, in such a way
that due account is taken of the sovereignty and interests of all States.
Recommendation 51, UN Doc. A/Conf.48/14, partially reprinted in Caponera, supra note 1, at 15456.
38. Id.
39. G.A. Res. 2997 (XXVII) of 15 December 1972, U.N. Resolutions Adopted by the General
Assembly during its Twenty Seventh Session, 19 September-19 December 1972, at p. 62.
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In 1974, a Resolution of the U.N. General Assembly proclaiming the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States stated that:
In the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more countries, each State must cooperate on the basis of a system of information and prior consultation in order to achieve optimum use of
such resources without causing damage to the legitimate interest of
others . . . all States have the responsibility to ensure that activities
within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.'
Institutional arrangements for the management of water resources among
states sharing common basins have always been created or assisted by
other international organizations, under the overall sponsorship of the
U.N. Economic and Social Council. 4 For instance, the FAO assists national governments and river basin committees in drafting water laws and
in the building of institutions.42 UNESCO activities have developed since
1949 to assess water resources, first through its Arid Zones Program43
and later through the International Hydrological Decade. 44 Since 1975,
the International Hydrological Program (IHP) managed over ninety IHP
national committees and more than twenty national focal points. The IHP,
moreover, has launched three major regional projects for "the rational
utilization and conservation of water resources in rural areas," covering
Latin America, the Caribbean, the Arab States, and Africa, some of which
included studies of shared aquifers. 4" The World Health Organization
(WHO), through its International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation
Decade,' has been a spearhead in promoting field projects involving
water supply and sanitation activities. WHO is also the leading agency,
in cooperation with UNEP, UNESCO, and the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO), to sponsor the Global Environmental Monitoring
40. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974, U.N. Resolutions Adopted by the General
Assembly during its Twenty Ninth Session, Vol. 1, 17 September-18 December 1974, pp. 50, 52,
55.
41. For a description of these activities, see Note on Guide to Agencies and Offices of the United
Nations System Active in the Water Field, Report of the Joint Inspection Unit, Geneva, June 1981,
pp. 3-4 (JIU/NOTE/81/1) [hereinafter cited as NOTE].
42. FAO assists the following institutions: Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC); Mirim Lagoon
Commission (Brazil and Argentina); Nepal-India Kosi/Ganges basins; Niger/Nigeria Mixed Commission (Kamadougou Yobe); Maputo, Komati, and Limpopo basins (Botswana, Mozambique,
Republic of South Africa, Swaziland).
43. NOTE, supra note 41, at 12. For a brief explanatory account of the Arid Zones Program,
see I NATURE AND RESOURCES 1-5 (No. 1, 2).
44. NOTE, supra note 41, at 12; see also I NATURE AND RESOURCES 1-3 (No. 3).
45. NOTE, supra note 41 at 11-12.
46. Id. at 14-5. See 34 U.N.Y.B. 1286 (1980).
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Systems (GEMS) project.47 In conjunction with FAO regarding agricultural water development projects, WHO and UNEP have also initiated a
program to monitor the control of disease vectors associated with water,
such as malaria mosquitos, and bilharzia snails.48 The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) also maintains the role of assessing water
resources, particularly with regard to hazards of meteorological origin
such as droughts, floods, and tropical cyclones. Regional cooperation in
water resources is organized through WHO's six regional associations
and some activities are carried out in cooperation with river basin commissions."
Regional Political and Economic Institutions
More detailed models of international cooperation are provided by
agencies of regional scope. The mechanisms developed by these agencies
are consistent with the peculiarities of each water system and related
socioeconomic conditions. The legal-institutional problems raised by the
use of shared water resources are under constant survey by practically
all of the U.N. regional commissions. The U.N. Economic Commission
for Europe (ECE) has a well established machinery for cooperation between its member governments." The Committee on Water Problems has
been particularly concerned with surface and groundwater policy, legislation and management, as well as the field of transboundary waters. In
1980 the ECE Declaration of Policy on the Prevention and Control of
Water Pollution, including Transboundary Pollution adopted fourteen
principles to assist European countries in the use and management of
shared water resources. Although the ECE is not engaged in operational
water projects, it does, however, generate useful contacts between governments and experts as, for example, during the meetings on International River Commissions which also took place in 1980,"
The U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA),5" in im47. Under GEMS, three to four hundred river stations are being established to measure pollution.
NOTE, supra note 41, at 15-6. See also ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION
83 (D. Kay & H. Jacobson eds. 1983).
48. This program has now been illustrated in "Environmental Management for Vector Control
in Rice Fields," FAO Irrigation and Drainage Paper No. 41 (May 1984).
49. NOTE, supra note 41, at 15-6. Major WMO projects include those in hydrology in the Sahel,
Upper Nile, Indus, Ganges, Niger, and Amazon basins, and Central America.
50. The ECE Resolution 7:12 (XXII) of April 1967, art. 1, established for the first time a body
on Water Resources and Pollution Control. There are many subsequent resolutions which directed
the water programmes of ECE. Regarding cooperation in the field of transboundary waters, the
recent commission decisions D(XXXVII) and E(XXXVII) are relevant, U.N. Doc. WATER/SEM. Il/
3 of October 1984. See NOTE, supra note 41.
51. NOTE, supra note 41, at 7-8.
52. The ECLA authority to act in the field of water resources derives from ECLA Resolution 99
(VI) of September 15, 1958, followed by many other resolutions. Of particular interest is ECLA
Resolution 131 (VII) of May 17, 1957, which requested ECLA to approach Latin American countries
with regard to the utilization of rivers and lakes situated in international hydrographic basins. See
also NOTE, supra note 41.
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plementing the Mar del Plata Action Plan of 1977 through a sessional
committee, established a water resources unit in its secretariat. The water
resources unit promotes "intergovernmental cooperation in the management of shared water resources and facilitates coordination at the regional
level. ""
The U.N. Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)54 also has an important role in the field of shared water resources, particularly with regard
to assessing, planning, and providing for safe water supplies. The ECA
has set up an integrated regional interagency board to cooperatively develop international lake and river basins.55
The U.N. Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific
(ESCAP), 56 however, has the longest and most impressive history of
activities in the management of shared water resources. In 1951 cooperative arrangements on flood warning and mitigation, and on typhoon
and tropical cyclones warning systems, were initiated. The ESCAP, moreover, has been the prime motivating influence behind the creation and
support of the Mekong Committee, which is a precedent for international
river basin cooperation."
Finally, the U.N. Economic Commission for Western Asia (ECWA)58
has recently proposed to establish a regional Water Resources Council
and has been engaged in a number of activities to establish regional
cooperative institutions for the management of shared water resources.59
Outside the U.N. system, the intergovernmental agencies having responsibilities in shared water resources management have increased in
both number and multiformity. Outstanding among them is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which includes eighteen European countries.' The OECD is primarily concerned
with promoting policies designed to achieve economic expansion while
maintaining financial stability. The OECD has promoted methods and
53. NOTE, supra note 41, at 8-9.
54. The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) Conference of Ministers, by
Resolution 308 (XIII) of 1967 urged ECA to take all steps necessary to assist African countries in
the area of shared water resources. See also NOTE, supra note 40.
55. NOTE, supra note 41, at 6.
56. The ESCAP authority in the field of water resources derives from the ECAFE Resolution E/
CM.11/I 10 of June 8, 1948. See also NOTE, supra note 41.
57. NOTE, supra note 41, at 6. The Mekong Committee includes Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam,
and Thailand.
58. ECW's activities in water resources are a follow up on the U.N. Water Conference (ECWA
Regional Meeting, December 28, 1978-January 3, 1979, Riyad, Doc. E/C.7/94). See also NOTE,
supra note 41.
59. NOTE, supra note 41, at 9.
60. The members of the OECD include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Federal
Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, as well as Australia, Canada, Japan, New
Zealand, and the United States. For an account of the OECD and its activities, see, e.g., Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development Secretariat, Activities of the OECD in 1981: Report
by the Secretary-General, Paris, O.E.C.D. (1982).
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procedures for the economic development of beneficial uses of water
resources on the basis of mutual understanding and environmental pro-

tection. The OECD accomplishes its goals by examining common problems related to the improvement of water resources, by reviewing and

consulting on action proposed or taken by member countries, by providing
member governments with policy options or guidelines, and by encouraging the harmonization of policies among member countries. The OECD
has recommended water management policies and instruments61 in con-

junction with strategies for specific water pollutants control.62

Another regional agency which has contributed to the evolution of
water policies coordination between member countries is the Council of
Europe. The Council's Water Charter of 1967 stands as a landmark in
this field. 63 The European Economic Community (EEC),' moreover, has
promulgated effective directives which provide water quality standards
for drinking and fishing, as well as for municipal and industrial consumption. Other important actions of the EEC relate, to the exchange
of information in regard to groundwater protection, and to training in

water resources management.'

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) 67 and the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) 68 have carried out activities
61. Recommendation of the Council on Water Management Policies and Instruments, April 5,
1978, Paris, reprinted in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris Doc.
C(78)4 Final.
62. OECD Council Recommendation on Principles concerning Transfrontier Pollution, April 5,
1978, Paris, reprinted in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Paris Doc.
C(74)224.
63. The text of the Water Charter is in Legal Problems Relating to the Nonnavigational Uses of
International Water Courses: Supplementary Report by the Secretary-General, DOC. A/CN.4/274,
2 Y.B. IT'L L. COMM'N 342-43 (1974).
64. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Copmmunity (EEC), March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S.
3. See generally, INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (J. Lodge ed. 1983).
65. Council Directive Concerning the Quality Required of Surface Water Intended for the Abstraction of Drinking Water in the Member States, June 16, 1975, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 194)
38 (1975); Council Directive on Pollution Caused by Dangerous Substances Discharged into the
Aquatic Environment of the Community, May 1976, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 129) 23 (1976);
Council Directive Relating to the Quality of Water Intended for Human Consumption, July 15, 1980,
23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 229) 11 (1980).
66. A European Training Center in Water Resources Management has been established, under
EEC sponsorship, at Varese, Italy, in 1983.
67. The CMEA includes Albania, Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic
Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Rumania, USSR, and VietNam. For a description of the
CMEA within the international setting, see Lukin, The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance and
the United Nations in REGIONALISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS 449-87 (B. Andemicael ed. 1979).
68. The European Committee for Standardization was founded in March 1961 as the European
Standards Coordinating Committee among the socialist states of Eastern Europe in succession to a
Common Market and Free Trade Area Committee set up in October, 1957. Its present title was
adopted in 1971 and the Committee was reconstituted on October 24, 1975 in Brussels. It is registered
in accordance with Belgian law. See 23 Y.B. INT'L ORG. (1983). The CEN's activities regarding
the Danube basin are described in UN/ECE Committee on Water Problems, Seminar on Rational
Utilization of Water 3-4, Doc. UN/WATER/SEM.6/R.42 (April 17, 1979).
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particularly relevant in the Danube basin, which is shared by eight countries. The Council and the Committee have done much work to promulgate
international standards to control the quality and quantity of water, to
prevent water losses, to promote and install new technologies and equipment for the treatment of water and waste water, and to develop irrigation
projects having regional implications.
Again, at the regional level, the Amazon Cooperation Treaty of 1978
has established institutional cooperative arrangements among eight countries sharing the Amazon Basin: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,
Guyana, Peru, Surinam, and Venezuela. 69
River and Boundary Commissions
Although regional organizations have proved more efficient than those
operating at a universal level, international mechanisms of cooperation
have obtained the best results with regard to single, specific watercourses
or basins. These institutions are created by the states concerned and have
a scope geographically limited either to a given water basin, to boundary
waters, or to a statutorily defined basin area. The local organs are either
permanent or ad hoc, and consist of a standard secretariat, a technical
staff, and advisory boards, as well as political organs representing the
member countries and an executive council. The institutions may differ
according to the powers and functions attributed to the technical bodies
as well as the voting procedures adopted by the political organs representing the member states. Some agencies have a direct impact on the
municipal system of member countries. Other institutions, however, have
limited competence, and will only disseminate information and provide
documentation and consultation. International practice is so varied that
the best way to describe it is to select a few examples from among the
most representative ones.
The Rhine and the Danube river commissions illustrate the traditional
models of international practice. The Central Commission for the Rhine
was created in 183170 after a lengthy process dating back to 1785 and
1816. The Rhine Commission currently includes representatives from
France, Federal Republic of Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, and Great Britain. The Commission essentially provides consultation and technical assistance in matters primarily affecting navigation.
The Rhine Commission, however, can also undertake research studies,
and recommend to member states the provisions to be adopted in their
respective municipal systems. Ordinarily decisions are made by majority
vote, but are not binding upon dissenting countries; major policy decisions
69. Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation signed in Brasilia, July 3, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 1045.
70. Convention Relative to the Free Navigation of the Rhine, signed at Mayence, March 31,
1831, France-various German states, 10 HERTSLETT, COMMERCIAL TREATIES 47 1(F).
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require unanimity. A separate Commission, to promote cooperation in the
control of pollution, was created in 1949-50 by an exchange of notes.7
The European Commission of the Danube 72 is an administrative body, in
operation since 1948, which includes representatives from Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine, USSR, and Yugoslavia. At present the regime of the Danube is regulated by the Belgrade
Convention of 1948 and by a series of special agreements. The Danube
Commission enacts uniform navigation rules, facilitates flood control
operations, sponsors integrated energy planning, and encourages irrigation projects. Recommendations on ordinary matters are taken by a majority vote, but states directly affected by important issues have a veto
power. Another organization primarily concerned with hydropower and
navigation projects has been created for the administration of the lower
Danube and the Iron Gates. 73
The International Joint Commission (IJC) established pursuant to the
Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 between Canada and the United States,
is a significant illustration of modern trends in international cooperation
regarding shared water resources. Consisting of six members, three from
each country, this Commission was originally conceived as an instrument
for preventing any water controversy between the two riparian states by
examining differences between the two states and endeavouring to settle
them. Over the course of time the IJC has acquired competence in a
wider field. The IJC currently approves, by majority vote, all projects
concerning new water uses, undertakes investigations and prepares studies
of the projects, and makes proposals and creates auxiliary organs to
facilitate its work. Various boards of the IJC are staffed with qualified
engineers, economists, and lawyers from both countries. These investigative boards examine and recommend short and long-term planning for
a balanced development of the Great Lakes area. The IJC, moreover,
elaborates and supervises new projects, and formulates standards of conduct.74
The International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC),75 con71. For references on the Central Commission for the navigation of the Rhine, see B.

VITANYI,

THE INTERNATIONAL REGIME OF RIVER NAVIGATION 101-02 (1979).

72. The first Danube Commission was established by the Treaty of Peace signed in Paris, March
30, 1856, Ottoman Empire-Other European Powers, arts. 16 and 17, 41 B.F.S.P. 8, 12. The second
Danube Commission, created in 1857, also included nonriparian states until 1948, when another
Danube Commission was formed among riparian states only. Convention Regarding the Regime of
Navigation on the Danube signed at Belgrade, August 18, 1948, 33 U.N.T.S. 180 (1949). For the
provisions dealing with the nature and functions of the Commission, see especially id., arts. 5-22.
73. See Secretariat of the Danube Commission, Practice and Principles of Development of the
Danube Basin, Seminar on the Development and Administration of the International River Basin,
Doc. No. 12 (2d ed. 1963).
74. For a description of the work of the International Joint Commission, see BLOOMFIELD &
FrZGERALD, BOUNDARY WATER PROBLEMS, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES (1958).

75. The International Boundary and Water Commission was created by the Treaty Relating to the
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cerned with the Colorado and Rio Grande rivers and the Tijuana stream,
is another interesting example of bilateral cooperation in the use of shared
water resources. This institution not only exercises supervisory and advisory powers, but the IBWC has responsibility for the planning, construction, and maintenance of three storage dams on the Rio Grande. In
1983, Mexico and the United States signed an agreement for the purpose
of cooperatively solving environmental problems along the border area,
including watercourses. To implement this agreement, each party has
designated a coordinator to make recommendations and convoke meetings
of experts as necessary for the purpose of coordinating the parties' national
programs.76 Many boundary commissions exist which have jurisdiction
over shared rivers and basins along the border of two countries, particularly in the Americas," Europe,78 and Africa.7 9
Other Pertinent Commissions and Institutions
Still other forms of cooperative institutional arrangements have developed throughout the world, particularly in recent years. In Asia, among
Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo)
from Fort Quitman, Texas to the Gulf of Mexico, November 14, 1944, Mexico-United States, 3
U.N.T.S. 314. For the scope of the International Boundary and Water Commission, see id. at art.
2.
76. 20 ILM 1025 (1983).
77. E.g., the joint commissions established by the Agreement Concerning a Study on the Parana
River signed at Buenos Aires, June 15, 1971, Argentina-Paraguay, arts. I and 4, OEA Rios y Lagos
Internacinales 5119 (1971); Agreement on the Use of Binational Basins Puyango-Tumbes and
Catamayo-Chire signed at Washington, D.C., September 27, 1971, Ecuador-Peru, art. 14, 385
Registro Oficial (Ecuador) 1 (1972).
78. Treaty Concerning Frontier Waters signed at Stockholm, September 16, 1971, Finland-Sweden, ch. 2, 825 U.N.T.S. 191 (establishing joint Finnish-Swedish boundary river commission);
Treaty Concerning Frontier Watercourses signed at Helsinki, April 2, 1964, Finland-U.S.S.R., art.
6 et. seq., 537 U.N.T.S. 231 (establishing joint Finnish-U.S.S.R. boundary commission); Treaty
Concerning Boundary Waters signed at Warsaw, July 17, 1964, Poland-U.S.S.R., art. R et seq.,
552 U.N.T.S. 175 (establishing USSR-Polish water economy frontier commission); Treaty on Water
Economy and Statutes of the Commission signed at Belgrade, December 5, 1956, Albania-Yugoslavia, 1857 Federatione Naradnme Republike Yugoslavie, Medunarodni Ugovari at 16 (establishing
joint water boundary commissions between Yugoslavia and Albania); Treaty on Water Economy
Questions signed at Sofia, April 4, 1958, Bulgaria-Yugoslavia, art. 9, 538 U.N.T.S. 89 (establishing
joint water boundary commissions between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria); Treaty on Hydro-economy
Questions signed at Athens on June 18, 1959, Greece-Yugoslavia, art. 1, 363 U.N.T.S. 133 (establishing joint water boundary commissions between Yugoslavia and Greece); Treaty on Water
Control and Water Control Systems and on the Statutes of the Commission signed at Bucharest,
April 7, 1955, Romania-Yugoslavia, 73 F.N.R.Y.-M.U. (1956) (establishing joint water boundary
commissions between Yugoslavia and Romania); Agreement and Statute of the Yugoslav-Hungarian
Water Economy Commission signed at Belgrade, August 8, 1955, Hungary-Yugoslavia, 63 F.N.R.Y.M.U. 43 (1957); Treaty on Legal Relations and on Cooperation in Frontier Matters signed at Prague,
December 2, 1967, Czechoslovakia-Poland, art. 12, 830 U.N.T.S. 113 (establishing joint water
boundary commissions between Poland and Czechoslovakia).
79. See, e.g., Treaty establishing the Niger-Nigeria Joint Commission signed at Niamey, 3 March
1971, Niger-Nigeria (text provided by the Secretariat) for the purpose, inter alia, to develop shared
water resources.
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the multilateral institutions operating in the region, the Committee for
the Lower Mekong River especially deserves to be mentioned."s Established between Campuchea, Laos, Thailand, and the Republic of VietNam,
pursuant to an agreement of 1957 on the initiative of the Economic
Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), the Lower Mekong
River Committee consists of one delegate from each member state. The
Committee promotes, coordinates, supervises, and controls the planning
and investigation of water development projects in the lower basin of the
Mekong river. The most characteristic feature of the Lower Mekong River
Committee is the close cooperation it has established with U.N. agencies
and other organizations, especially with ECAFE. The Committee appoints
an executive agent for a term of two years and includes a secretariat, an
advisory board appointed for a three-year term, and a documentation
center."' One of the main achievements of the Mekong Committee has
been that it has operated uninterruptedly since 1955 in spite of the political
difficulties and armed conflicts prevailing among its member countries.
The so-called "Spirit of the Mekong" has demonstrated that cooperative
arrangements on transboundary water questions may continue even in
times of armed conflict.
The Permanent Indus Commission, established in 1960 between India
and Pakistan, is another example of bilateral institutions in Asia.82 India
and Pakistan have each appointed a high-ranking engineer whose function
not only includes the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation
and application of the 1960 Agreement, but also the study of problems
referred by the two governments. The Indus Commission may also conduct inspections and make recommendations. The main purpose of this
agency is to prepare specific cooperative arrangements, but it also initiates
studies, and coordinates the parties' water policies. A particular feature
of the Indus Commission is the heavy involvement of the World Bank
(IBRD).83 In 1972, an agreement between India and Bangladesh84 created
a joint river commission for harnessing the water resources shared be80. Statute of the Committee for Coordinating Investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin affirmed
and signed at Phnom-Penh, October 31, 1957, established by the government of Cambodia (now
Kampuchea), Laos, Thailand, and the Republic of VietNam, in response to a decision taken by UN/
ECAFE. UNITED NATIONS, LEGISLATIVE TEXTS AND TREATY PROVISIONS CONCERNING THE USE OF
INTERNATIONAL RIVERS FOR OTHER PURPOSES THAN NAVIGATION 369 (1964) (Doc. ST/LEG. SER. E/
12).
81. See the Mekong Committee Annual Reports issued since 1958 by the Executive Mekong
Committee Secretariat in Bangkok. See L. TECLAFF, THE RIVER BASIN IN HISTORY AND LAW 172
(1967).
82. Indus Water Treaty signed at Karachi, September 19, 1960, India-Pakistan-IBRD (World
Bank), art. 8, 419 UN T.S. 125.
83. In fact, the IBRD was instrumental in setting up the Permanent Indus Commission in order
to settle a water conflict between India and Pakistan. See TECLAFF, supra note 81, at 164.
84. Agreement Creating a Joint Ganges Commission, November 29, 1972, Bangladesh-India,
reprinted in Indo-Bangladesh Joint River Commission Publication, Dhaka.
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tween the two countries. As a consequence of a dispute caused by India's
building of the Farakka dam just before the Ganges enters Bangladesh,
another agreement was signed in 1977 for the allocation of the Ganges
waters between the two countries. 8 5 This 1977 Agreement reflects a commitment to the principles of prior consultation before undertaking water
resources development, as well as a commitment to the equitable apportionment of shared water resources. The 1977 Agreement was valid initially for a period of five years, but was renewed in 1982 for a period
of two years under the form of a memorandum of understanding; it appears
that no new agreement has been signed since 1984.6

Africa offers a large number of multilateral river institutions which
have increased in number, variety, and importance since World War II.
The decolonization process and the need felt by African governments for
economic regional integration provided the incentive to establish these
river institutional bodies. The International Commission for the Navigation of the River Congo, created by the Act of Berlin of 1885, is an
historical precedent, because it introduced the principle of freedom of
navigation to African rivers.8 7 The Act of Berlin also applied the principle
of freedom of navigation to the Niger, although a special institution was
not created.
In 1964, a Niger River Commission was created between the nine
riparian countries for promoting and coordinating all programs and studies
related to the exploitation of the basin resources. The Niger River Commission is assisted by a Secretary General and an appropriate staff of
experts. The personnel of the commission are entrusted with certain planning functions, exchanging information, preparing recommended decisions to be taken by member governments, and facilitating the settlement
of disputes between the parties. 8 In 1980 the Niger River Commission
was transformed into the Niger River Authority for the purpose of insuring
an integrated developmental program for all Niger basin water resources
activities, and not only for the aspects of river navigation. 9 The insti85. Agreement Between the Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh and the Government of the Republic of India on Sharing of the Ganges Waters at Farakka and in Augmenting
its Flows signed at Dacca, November 5, 1977, Bangladesh-India, 17 I.L.M. 103 (1978). For a
description of the Ganges dispute, see River Basin Development, 4 Water Resources Series (M.
Zaman ed. 1981).
86. Private communication to the author.
87. General Act of the Conference of Berlin respecting Freedom of Navigation of the Congo,
February 26, 1885, art. 17 (establishing the International Commission of the Congo), HERTSLETT,
17 COMMERCIAL TREATIES 62.
88. Act regarding Navigation and Economic Cooperation between the Nine Co-basin States of
the Niger Basin, October 26, 1963, arts. 5 and 6, 587 U.N.T.S. 9.
89. Convention creating the Niger Basin Authority, November 21, 1980, art. 3, reprinted in
United Nations, Treaties Concerning the Utilization of International Water Courses for Other Purposes
than Navigation, Africa, 13 Natural Resources Water Series 56, U.N. Sales No. E/F.84.11 A.7
[hereinafter cited as UN/Africa Water Treaties]. The parties to the Convention include Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Ivory Coast, Guinea, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Upper Volta.
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tutions of the Niger River Authority are: (1) the Summit of Heads of
State and government; (2) the Council of Ministers representing the member States; (3) the Technical Committee of Experts; and (4) the Executive
Secretariat. The quorum of the Summit and of the Council of Ministers
is a simple majority and the decisions, directives, resolutions, and recommendations so adopted by consensus are binding on the institutions
of the Authority. The functions of the Authority include the collection,
centralization, standardization, exploitation, dissemination, and exchange
of technical data; coordination and consideration of plans and projects
presented by member states with a view toward making recommendations;
monitoring of research and works undertaken by member states; and plan
coordination and formulation.'
The Senegal River Basin Management Organization (OMVS) was created between Mali, Mauritania, Senegal, and Guinea in 1972, with the
purpose to encourage and coordinate water resources development in the
Senegal river basin. 9 The main organs are: (1) a Conference of Heads
of State upon which rest all final decisions; (2) a Council of Ministers
which makes decisions or recommendations to the Conference and prepares and controls the activities of the Organization; (3) a High Commissioner (added in 1979); (4) a Secretary General; (5) a Permanent Water
Commission; and (6) an Advisory Board to deal with water resource
sharing. A number of subcommittees have been set up for administrative
and judicial matters concerning navigation, hydropower, and irrigation.
The unaminous decisions of the Conference and of the Council of Ministers of the OMVS automatically bind its member states. Some major
decisions of the OMVS include the principles that all works of common
interest shall be jointly owned by the member states, and member states
will be jointly liable for debts contracted. 92 The creation and work of
OMVS have been inspired by the most recent and advanced doctrines
based on the concept of international basin waters and integrated equitable
sharing of the basin water resources. Water rights of each member state
of the OMVS are limited by the respective rights of the other states and
are developed through planning for the exploitation of the joint resources.
A number of similarly advanced forms of institutional arrangements
for the integrated development of shared river and lake basins have been
created in Africa. These include the Lake Chad Basin Commission (LCBC)
90. See id., art. 4.2a.
91. Convention relative au statut du fleuve Senegal, March 11, 1972, Mali-Mauritania-Senegal,
reprinted in UN/Africa Water Treaties, supra note 89, at 21. This convention replaced the previous
convention of February 7, 1964. There is a large literature describing the historical evolution of the
institutions relating to the Senegal River basin, but see Parnall & Utton, The Senegal ValleyAuthority:
A Unique Experiment in International Basin Planning, 51 IND. L.J. 235 (1976).
92. Resolution of the Council of Ministers of the OMVS No. 4/74, later embodied in the Convention on the Legal Status of Works of Common Interest, December 21, 1978, Mali-MauritaniaSenegal, reprinted in UN/Africa Water Treaties, supra note 89, at 48.
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between Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria;93 the Organization for the
Development of the Gambia River Basin (OMVG) between Gambia,
Republic of Guinea, and Senegal, 94 and later by Guinea (Conakry), 95 the
fourth co-basin state. In 1983, Guinea Bissau, although not a state sharing
the Gambia basin, joined this organization.96 This demonstrates that basin
organizations may serve as focal starting points not only for water resources management, but also for larger economic integration. The Kagera Basin Organization, created in 1971 between Burundi, Rwanda, and
Tanzania and later joined by Uganda, purports to plan and develop jointly
the Kagera sub-basin, which is a part of the Nile basin.97
Other forms of international cooperation for the management of shared
water resources exist in Africa. Some technical commissions have been
created in special areas. In 1971, a Niger-Nigeria mixed commission was
created for the development of boundary rivers, particularly the Komadogou-Yobe, a sub-basin of the Lake Chad basin. 98 Close institutional
arrangements exist between Egypt and Sudan for sharing of the Nile
waters, 99 and between all Nile basin states with regard to collection of
hydrologic data."°° The creation of a Nile Basin Commission with the
participation of all basin states is under serious consideration.
Finally, new institutional mechanisms in the form of joint permanent
technical committees have recently been created in southern Africa for
the joint planning and development of the water resources shared between
the kepublic of South Africa and the Front Line States of Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe.' 0 The possibility of cre93. Convention and Statutes relating to the Development of the Chad Basin signed at Fort Lamy,
May 22, 1964, reprinted in UN/Africa Water Treaties, supra note 89, at 8 (establishing the Lake
Chad Basin Commission).
94. Earlier treaties include the Treaty of Association, April 19, 1967, Gambia-Senegal (creating
an interministerial Committee); April 16, 1976, (establishing a Coordinating Committee); these were
substituted for by the Convention relating to the Status of River Gambia and the Convention relating
to the creation of the Gambia Basin Development Organization (OMVG) signed at Kaolak, June
30, 1978, Republic of Gambia-Republic of Senegal, reprinted in UN/Africa Water Treaties, supra
note 89, at 39, 42.
95. Guinea (Konakry) became a party to the Convention by virtue of Resolution of the Conference
of Heads of State and Governments of OMVG, June 6, 1981.
96. In June, 1983, in order to allow membership of a non-basin state, art. 15 of the River Gambia
Convention, and art. 21 of the Convention establishing OMVG were amended.
97. Agreement for the Establishment of the Organization for the Management and Development
of the Kagera River Basin (OBK) signed at Rusumo, August 24, 1977, reprinted in UN/Africa
Water Treaties, supra note 89 at 32; Uganda became a member of the organization by Agreement
of May 19, 1981, reprinted in UN/Africa Water Treaties, supra note 89, at 70.
98. The Commission was established by the Agreement of March 3, 1971, and revised by the
Protocol of December 22, 1973, between Niger and Nigeria. (Text made available to the author by
the Mixed Commission).
100. The Hydromet Project was initiated in 1967 under the auspices of WHO.
101. Agreements establishing a Joint Permanent Technical Committee, August 18, 1979, Kingdom
of Swaziland-Republic of South Africa; April, 1983, Mozambique-Swaziland; November, 1982,
Botswana-Mozambique; May 8, 1983, Mozambique-Swaziland. (Texts have been made available
to the author by the concerned governments).
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ating a Limpopo basin organization is under consideration by the
governments of Botswana, Mozambique, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, to
which South Africa might later accede, and efforts are being made for
organizations as regards the Tanganyika River, Zaire,
the creation of0basin
2
and Zambesi. 1
Several river commissions have also been created in Central and South
America. An interesting example is the Joint Commission for the Integrated Development of the Mirim Lagoon basin shared by Brazil and
Uruguay.' 3 Various joint mixed commissions have also been established
between El Salvador and Guatemala for Lake Juija;" Ecuador and Peru
for the Puyango-Tumbes binational project;0 5 Argentina and Paraguay on
the utilization of the waters of the Pilcomayo river; ° Argentina and
Paraguay for the utilization of hydropower of the Apipe Falls;0 7 Bolivia
and Peru for the joint utilization of Lake Titicaca;' ° Argentina and Uruguay relating to the utilization of the rapids of Salto Grande; ° and for
the Uruguay River." 0
The River Plata Intergovernmental Commission, which was approved
in 1968 by of a series of agreements between Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Paraguay, and Uruguay, was created to coordinate activities involving
the largest river basins in South America."' This Commission consists
of one delegate from each member state, and has authority granted by
102. These attempts are being made under the sponsorship of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa and the United Nations Environment Programme.
103. Exchange of Notes for the Establishment of the Joint Commission of Mirim Lagoon Basin
(CLM), April 26, 1963, Brazil-Uruguay, 622 U.N.T.S. 259; and of May 20, 1974, 957 U.N.T.S.
255; Treaty of Brasilia, July 7, 1977, D.O. No. 20169 (Uruguay) of January 9, 1978, at 41-A.
104. Agreement on Free Trade and Economic Integration, April 15, 1957, El Salvador-Guatemala,
art. 7, 131 U.N.T.S. 132.
105. Agreement on the Utilization of the Binational Basins of Puyango-Tumbes and CatamayoChira, September 27, 1971, Ecuador-Peru 385 Registro Oficial (Ecuador) of January 4, 1972, at L.
and Maintenance of the River
106. Agreement for the Regulation, Channelling, Dredging ....
Paraguay, July 15, 1969, Argentina-Paraguay, art. 1, 709 U.N.T.S. 311.
107. Agreement concerning a Study of the Utilization of the Water Power of Apipe Falls, January
23, 1958, Argentina-Paraguay, art. 2-6. 649 U.N.T.S. 175.
108. Agreement concerning the Joint Utilization of the Waters of Lake Titicaca, February 19,
1957, Bolivia-Peru, U.N.T.S. at 168.
109. Agreement concerning the Utilization of the Rapids of the Uruguay River in the Salto Grande
Area, December 30, 1946, Argentina-Uruguay, art. 2, 671 U.N.T.S. 17 (revised Nov. 26, 1958 and
Oct.20, 1972).
110. Agreement concerning the Statute of the Uruguay River, February 26, 1975, ArgentinaUruguay, Comision Mixta de Salto Grande, Documentos y Antecedentes (April 1981).
111. The regional system of the Rio de la Plata was brought into being at successive meetings
of the ministers for foreign affairs of Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay. At the first
of these meetings in Buenos Aires, April 24, 1967, a basin-level coordinating system was created;
at the second meeting at Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia, May 18-20,1968, the Statutes of the
Committee were approved; at the third meeting in Brasilia, April 24-5, 1969, the La Plata Basin
Organization was institutionalized with the Treaty of the Plata River Basin, 8 I.L.M., Current
Documents 905 (1969).
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the Council of Foreign Ministers. The purpose of the River Plata Commission is to provide general directives for the developoment of the Plata
basin, especially with respect to navigation and hydropower. The Commission provides the usual data gathering, consultation facilities, exchange of information, and other related services.
The Amazon Cooperation Treaty was signed in 1978 by Bolivia, Brazil,
Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Surinam, and Venezuela." 2 The Treaty
applies to the entire Amazon basin, and also to certain territories which
are considered closely related to the basin because of their geographical,
ecological, and economic characteristics. The party states may carry out
projects in their territories in accordance with the principle of good and
friendly neighborly relations and international legal restrictions. The organs of the Amazon Treaty are the Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign
Affairs, the Amazon Cooperation Council (consisting of senior diplomats
of the member states), and the Secretariat to be provided by the state
hosting the meeting of the Council. Unanimity is required for decisions
taken by the Meeting of Ministers and by the Council.
CONCLUSION
The use, administration, and protection of water resources in international relations can be satisfactorily regulated only by specific arrangements establishing some kind of permanent cooperation between the states
concerned. Specific arrangements are required because each river basin
or system has its own peculiarities; general rules of international law
cannot cope with such a differentiated reality. Agreements on the allocation of costs and benefits are sufficient to determine each state's share
and responsibilities without the support of appropriate joint institutions
to deal with the increasingly complex problems of common water management. General rules, however, emphasize the interdependence of states'
interests in optimum utilization of the world's water resources in a global
perspective. Progress achieved thus far in the use, administration, and
protection of international water resources shows that the most sensible
line of action would be to expand and improve on existing mechanisms
of intergovernmental cooperation by strengthening or creating international administration.

112. Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation (TAC) signed in Brasilia on July 3, 1978, 17 I.L.M.
1045 (1978). For an historical account of this treaty see Landau, The Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation:A Bold New Instrument for Development, 10 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 467 (1980).

